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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to § 
78-2a-3(2)(j) Utah Code Annotated. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
I. Does a trial court have jurisdiction to enter judgment 
against a non party to a suit without service of summons or the 
non party's agreement to be made a party to the action and to 
enter a judgment against him? Correction of error standard, no 
deference, Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). 
II. Can a trial court summarily enter judgment against a 
non party on the pursuant to a disputed stipulation? Id. 
STATUES AND RULES 
All of these authorities, as well certain key cases are 
included in the Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
i. Nature of the case. This appeal results from a judgment 
entered by the Third District Court, Judge Pat B. Brian 
presiding, against William B. Hill ("HILL") personally though he 
was never a party to the action and was not served with a 
summons. 
ii. Course of proceedings. The procedural history of this 
case is as follows. 
Initial Complaint - In 1985, Steven and Fred Hays ("HAYS"), 
plaintiffs/ respondents, initiated an action against defendant, 
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an entity known as Mountain Equipment Sales and Leasing Company 
("MSEL"). R. 00002-00005 
Default Judgment - Later in 1985 Hays a default judgment was 
entered against MSEL. R. 00012-00013. 
Attempt to execute on nonparty - Approximately August, 1988 
Hays attempted to collect on its judgment by executing against 
personal vehicles of Kerry G. Smith ("SMITH") and William E. Hill 
even though neither was party to the lawsuit. R. 00019 and 
00025. 
Order to show cause - About February, 1989, an Order to 
Appear and Show Cause why Hill and Smith should not be required 
to produce the vehicles was entered by Judge Brian. R. 00021. 
Order to show cause hearing - On January 19, 1990, a hearing 
was held on the Order to Show Cause. At that time the Court 
agreed to hold an evidentiary hearing. R. 00036 
Evidentiary hearing - On May 31, 1990, an evidentiary hearing 
was held. The hearing having been continued from April 11, 1990. 
R. 00045. 
Purpose of evidentiary hearing to determine status of Hill -
The hearing was for the purpose ^r determining whether Hill was a 
partner of MESL. R. 00103. 
Court finding that Hill was a partner and that Hays could 
proceed against Hill's personal assets - The Court held that Hill 
was a partner and ordered that an evidentiary hearing be set for 
December 11, 1990 to determine the amount of Hays' default 
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judgment against MESL. The court further ordered that the Hays 
could execute against Hill's assets at the conclusion of the 
evidentiary hearing. R. 00105. 
Hearing to determine the amount of judgment - The December, 
1990 hearing was continued to January 16, 1991. At the January 
hearing a stipulation was reached and read into the record as to 
the amount of the judgment. R. 00107 
Objection to court's prior determination that Hays could 
proceed against Hill's personal assets and motion to strike and 
clarify - Prior to an order being signed with respect to the 
stipulation reached on January 16, 1991, a motion was filed by 
Hill. The motion sought to strike the portion of the court order 
that Hays could execute upon Hill's personal assets. The motion 
further sought clarification by the court, to wit, having found 
that Hill was a partner of MSEL, whether any judgment obtained 
against MSEL could be satisfied by the personal assets of Hill 
since Hill was not a party to the action. R. 00111. 
Court held that it lacked power to enter judgment against 
Hill personally but found that the stipulation bound Hill - On 
April 2, 1991, a hearing was held on Hill's clarification motion. 
The court granted Hill's motion and struck the language from its 
previous order that the judgment obtained against MSEL could be 
satisfied by the personal assets of Hill. However, the court 
held that the stipulation read into the record at the January, 
1991 constituted an agreement by Hill that he would be personally 
liable for the MESL judgment. R. 00210. 
- v -
Objection to finding that stipulation bound Hill and request 
for trial - On April 4, 1991, Hill objected to the court's 
finding that the stipulation read into the record at the January, 
1991 hearing bound him personally and moved for a jury trial on 
that issue. R. 00249. 
Order entered over Hill's objection - Notwithstanding Hill's 
objection, an order and judgment was entered against Hill 
personally based upon the stipulation. R. 00271. 
iii. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
Judge Brian's erroneous judgment and order is based upon his 
determination that Hill bound himself to a personal judgment as a 
result of the stipulation. Relevant portions of the hearing in 
which the stipulation was made are as follows: 
1. The only purpose of hearing was to reduce the amount of 
the MESL judgment,. "THE COURT: The only purpose that the Court 
is conducting an evidentiary hearing is to determine the amount 
of the plaintiffs' default judgment." January 16, 1991 Tr. , P. 
4, L. 9-12. 
2. The Court's restated Lhat the purpose of the hearing was 
limited to reduction of the MESL judgment. "THE COURT: The 
Court is not going to go back and relitigate the decision by 
Judge Fishier. The purpose of this hearing, unless the Court 
misunderstood the position of both counsel in setting this 
hearing, was to determine how much the default judgment should 
- vi -
be." All counsel agreed to the court's statement. January 16, 
1991 Tr., P. 9, L. 3-9. 
3. Mr. Hill stipulated to reduce the MESL judgment amount. 
"MR. KUHNHAUSEN: I only represent Mr. Hill. I can only speak on 
behalf of him. He would agree that an equitable amount of the 
judgment should be $15,000. That doesn't waive any claims he may 
have that he wasn't a partner, your honor, whether or not he 
received notice, and those other claims, for the record. January 
16, 1991 Tr., P. 35, L. 9-14. 
4. Counsel for Mr. Hill clarified the stipulation. "MR. 
KUHNHAUSEN: Means we are here today on an evidentiary hearing, 
the Court would determine what the judgment would have been had 
your client put on a case. We will agree that $15,000 is a fair 
settlement — fair figure for the judgment to be entered. I 
don't know whether my client will ever appeal the issue of 
whether the Court determined him to be a partner, or not. I 
don't think that really an issue that has to be linked to this 
judgment amount. With that understanding, we would stipulate." 
January 16, 1991 Tr., P. 35, L. 16-24. 
5. Mr. TTill preserved his appeal rights. "MR. NTEr.SON: I 
think all he is saying is he reserves the right to appeal." The 
court then agreed that Mr. Hill was preserving his right to 
appeal. January 16, 1991 Tr., P. 35, L. 25; P. 36, L. 1. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In 1985, Hays, plaintiffs/respondents, initiated an action 
against MESL. 
Hays alleged in their Complaint that MESL was a partnership 
but made no mention of who the partners were. A default judgment 
was entered against MESL, an assumed name of Smith. New counsel 
for MESL later argued and the trial court originally held that 
Hill was a partner by estoppel in MESL and that he was bound by 
the judgment even though he had not been named in the lawsuit, 
had not been served with summons, etc. The parties entered into 
a conditional and ambiguous tentative settlement stipulation in 
open court based upon the trial court's erroneous ruling that 
Hill was bound by said judgment. (See § iii, Para. 1-4, Page 
VI-VII above.) Hill then successfully argued to the trial court 
that Hill was not bound by the judgment against MESL. (See 
appendix, Minute Entry, Defendant's Motion to Strike granted.) 
The trial court then erroneously concluded that Hill was bound by 
the stipulation and entered judgment against him for the amount 
discussed as a possible settlement in the stipulation. (See 
appendix, Minute Entry, Plaintiff's Motion for Fntry of Judqment 
is granted as per the stipulation reached on January 16, 1991 as 
to both defendants personally.) 
Appellant Hill asserts that the court had no jurisdiction to 
enter judgment against Hill, a non party to the suit, without 
amending the complaint to name Hill as a defendant and service of 
- 1 -
summons or without Hill's assent to be made a party to the action 
and to entry of a judgment against him. Appellant additionally 
asserts that the Court erred in summarily (sua sponte) entering 
judgment against him based upon the stipulation, the meaning of 
which is in dispute. (See § iii, Para. 1-4, Page VI-VII) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE. HILL IS NOT A PARTY TO THE ACTION AND THE COURT 
LACKS JURISDICTION TO MAKE HILL A PARTY WITHOUT HIS CONSENT. 
Hill has never been named individually as a defendant in this 
lawsuit. The default judgment obtained by Hays was against MESL. 
1. Jurisdiction is a prerequisite to a valid judgment. 4A 
Fed. Pr. & Proc, Wright & Miller § 1105, pages 135-146 
recognized the rule that judgment against an unincorporated 
association can only be enforced against the assets of the 
entity, and that to enter a valid judgment against an individual 
member of the association (such as Hill), the court must first 
acquire personal jurisdiction over him. Personal jurisdiction is 
acquired by suing the partner and serving him with summons. 
Because the trial court never obtained jurisdiction of Hill by 
Hill's consent in the January, 1991 stipulation or otherwise, a 
judgment could not have been entered against him personally. 
Further, 4A Fed. Pr. & Proc, Wright & Miller § 1688, page 
467 recognized the rule that once permission to add a party 
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defendant is granted, the plaintiff is requred to comply with 
Rules 3 and 4 delaing with service of summons, etc. 
2. A court cannot, sua spontef cause a non party to become a 
party. In Monroe City v. Arnold, 452 P.2d 321, 22 U.2d 291 (Utah 
1969), the Utah Supreme Court dealt with a a similar but less 
egregious fact situation. In that case the sons of the 
defendant, who had not been served with process, were in the 
courtroom during the trial. When evidence established that the 
sons were the real parties in interest, without naming the sons 
as defendants or serving them with process, the trial court made 
the sons defendants and forced them to participate in the trial. 
At the conclusion of the trial the court entered judgment against 
the father and the sons. The Supreme Court reversed as to the 
sons because they were not properly before the court. The 
present case is much stronger since Hill had no notice of the 
lawsuit or had an opportunity to appear and participate at the 
time the default judgment was entered. 
Similarly, the court in Spudnuts, Inc. v. Lane, 676 P.2d 669 
(Ariz. App. 1984), concluded that there was a due process 
violation to add a party defendant who was not served in the 
action and who had no chance to answer and defendant. 
3. Hill never consented to be a party to this action or to 
have judgment entered against him personally - The record is void 
of any written or oral consent of Hill to be made a party to this 
action. Hill is and has been at all times, a non party to the 
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action. Hill's only involvement is a questionable finding by the 
trial court that he was a partner by estoppel to the defendant. 
While that finding might support a lawsuit against Hill no such 
lawsuit was filed. Hill has never consented to having a judgment 
against him personally. The only inference of a possible consent 
was in the stipulation referred to in the statement of relevant 
facts. (Page VI-VII above.) Yet in that stipulation Hill merely 
agreed that the amount of the MESL judgment should be reduced. 
Hill expressly reserved the right to contest whether he was 
personally liable for the MESL judgment, his right to appeal, 
etc. The stipulation is anything but an unconditional agreement 
by Hill to pay the reduced amount of the MESL judgment to settle 
the lawsuit as concluded by the trial court. The trial court 
committed manifest error when it entered judgment against Hill 
personally for the amount of the MESL judgment. 
POINT TWO. BECAUSE THERE IS A DISPUTE TO THE FACTS UPON 
WHICH THE JUDGMENT IS BASED, JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
ENTERED WITHOUT A TRIAL ON THE ISSUE. 
Without a trial or evidentiary hearing th<* trial court held 
that pursuant to the stipulation read in open court In January, 
1991, Hill became personally liable for the MESL judgment. 
Thereafter the trial court issued an order and a judgment against 
Hill. The question of whether the terms of the stipulation 
amounted to a consent by Hill to be personally bound is a 
- 4 -
disputed question of fact. The trial court could determine that 
disputed question of fact without a trial. Courts are empowered 
to determine the law but facts are to be decided by the jury when 
a jury demand has been made. In this case, once the trial court 
determined that there was a disputed issue of whether Hill had 
consented to be personally bound, he erred by entering judgment 
against Hill without a trial and by not granting Hill's demand 
for a jury trial on the disputed issue of whether he had 
consented to become personally liable for the judgment. 
UCA 78-21-1 provides that issues of fact may be tried by a 
jury unless a jury is waived. Hill did not waive a jury, but to 
the contrary, he demanded a jury trial upon learning that the 
trial court determined that there was an issue of fact as to 
whether he had been personally bound by the stipulation. (See 
Appendix, Hill's Memorandum in Support of Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Order and Judgment, Motion to Amend 
Judgment, Motion for a Trial or New Trial and Demand for Jury 
Trial). See also, UCA 78-21-2 which mandates that in all cases 
where the trial is be by jury, all evidence thereon is to be 
addrossed to them, not the judge. 
The trial court's sua sponte determination that the 
stipulation bound Hill deprived him of his property without due 
process. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 7; 5th & 14th Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution. 
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Art. I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution provides in part that 
"no person shall be barred from defending before any tribunal in 
this state, , any civil cause to which he is a party." 
URCP 3, 5, 8, et seq. state the procedure for commencement of a 
civil action, URCP 4 provides for service of summons, etc. Hill 
has not waived his right to litigate the disputed issues in the 
usual manner, including the dispute as to the meaning of the 
stipulation and whether under the stipulation he was somehow made 
a party to the lawsuit and somehow allegedly consented that the 
judgment be against him individually. 
URCP 56 allows the Court to grant summary judgment only when 
there are no disputed material facts. The facts referred to the 
appellant's statement of facts clearly demonstrate that there are 
disputed issues of fact which if resolved in favor of Hill would 
entitle him to avoid personal liability. Accordingly, the Court' 
rejection of Hill's defenses and (in effect) summary judgment, 
were improper and should be vacated and set aside and Hill should 
be given a trial on said issues. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in ontering judgment against Hill 
individually as he was not a party to the action, never gave his 
consent to be a party, or to otherwise have judgment entered 
against him. 
The Court erred in ordering that the amended judgment be 
entered against Hill individually based upon a stipulation read 
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in open court because determination of the meaning of the 
stipulation was of a disputed fact to which Hill is entitled to a 
trial before a jury or at a minimum a trial before the court. 
Accordingly, that order should be vacated and the issue should be 
determined by a trial of that dispute in this case or in a new 
lawsuit. 
Respectfully submitted this f£) day of July, 1992. 
^Ronald C. Barker, 
David C. Cundick 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ' day of July, 1992, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, 
postage prepaid to: 
Francis J. Nielson 
ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON 
Attorney for Respondent 
310 South Main, #1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
I also certify that I lodged an unbound draft of this brief 
by mail on the IO day of July, 1992. 
Ronald C. Barker 
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APPENDIX 
Third JL.'J>:.;,-;! uh\ 
Francis J. Nielson, 2411 
ARNOYTIZ, SMITH & NIELSCN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-0524 
3S803 
NOV 1 3 1991 
f\ SALT LAK£ cpu\J\i 
IN THE DISTRICT (XDRT OF THE THUS) JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND K H SALT LAKE CDENIY, STEATE OF UTAH 
"•" • — o o O o o -
S m E N HAYS and FRED O. HAYS, 
iMfjiinrl i I I s , 
vs 
MINEAIN BQUIIMENT SALES 
AND LEAS D C (XMPANY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
n9008?QCV 
- -00O00- • 
The plaintiffs, Steven Hays nnd Tired n, Hays (Hays) obtained a 
Judgment against Mountain Equipment Sales And Leasing Canpany ONES' 
conmenced 1988, against 
Kerry (Snith) and William E. Hill (Hill) - alleged 
partners doing business as MESL. Shiith and Hill den 
MESI , - ij i :!  1 i 1 < :d a I I; > ti : n , :! oi Relief F I cm Judgment - Plaintiffs 
served Snith and Hill with an Order to Show Cause seeking a determination that 
they were partners doing business ««>•• M::si Tim n m H i-i^ ie^ n le<i HI V\ identiary 
determine whether Snith and Hill were partners in 
MESL. The Cou * its Memorandum Decision on October 29, 1990, ruling 
iadt atai ui ttnu ' f ricr <• i MESL, evidentiary 
hearing to determine the amount of plaintiffs1 Judgement on January 16, 1991. 
The Court heard testimony of the parties. Before ruling on the matter, the 
Court gave the parties an opportunity to discuss settlement. The parties 
entered into extensive settlement negotiations. The plaintiffs, Smith, and 
Hill, entered into a Stipulation for Settlement in which they agreed that 
Judgment would be entered against them personally in the principal amount of 
$15,000.00, plus interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum for 
fifty-three (53) months, in the amount of $6,625.00, for a total Judgment of 
$21,625.00. The plaintiffs agreed to wait ten (10) days to enforce the 
Judgment to determine if the parties could agree on a payment plan. The 
parties further agreed that if they could not agree upon a payment plan within 
the ten (10) day period, plaintiffs may proceed with post-Judgment remedies to 
collect the Judgment. The Settlement Agreement was read into the record. The 
Court asked Smith and Hill if they understood the agreement, and acquiesced 
therein. Smith and Hill replied in the affirmative. The Court instructed 
plaintiffs' counsel to prepare a Settlement Stipulation, Order and Judgment. 
The documents were prepared and submitted to Hill's attorney and Smith, all of 
wham declined to execute the documents. Hill retained Ronald C. Barker who 
filed Hill's Objection to plaintiffs' proposed Order and Judgment, a Motion to 
Amend the Judgment, a Motion for a Trial or New Trial, and Demand for Jury. 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Judgment and Hill's Motions vrere heard on April 2, 
1991. Having heard argument of counsel, and having heretofore entered a 
Memorandun Decision, and being fully advised in the premises, it is 
ORDERED: 
-9- n/io^/^ 
Mbtior Strike flu Ins( spn!piu>* nil1 (fir i null's 
t ( M n b e r .'H, Will, "Plaintiff may proceed 
against defendant William E Hill's assets at the conclusion oi the 
evidentiary hearing sranted. 
Motions to Amend Judgment, *-- • ~ ">* New Trial, 
and Demand for Jury are denied. 
3 , I" I in i in I I 1 s"" I'Vl 11 11 J 1 I ,ii 11 i .1 udgment aga inst defendants 
Snith and Hill personally pursuant to (he Settlement Stipulation agreed t 
open court on January $15,000.0 
I 4 III l ' r M ' H i l l I l I I Y I | M II I l y I f ) i 
$6,625.00, >tal Judgment of $21,625.00, is granted. 
Findings of * • 
sentenc said Order are hereby adopted and incorporated herein 
, *eferenc* Exhibit A ) J^ 
MTBD if' ; _ /Jj, day , *$KJT 1991. 
BY TOE COURT: 
SE^~ 4 
PAT B. BRIAN 
Thi rd Di st r ict i Xw\x i .I udge 
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Francis J. Nielson, 2411 
ARN3VITZ, SMITH & NIEL9CN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-0524 
39803 
IN THE DISTRICT CCQRT Of THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISflRlCT 
IN AND FCR SALT L4KE OGCNIY, SIATE OF UTAH 
— o o O o o — 
STEVEN HAYS and FRED O. HAYS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MXNIAIN EQUIRvENT SALES 
AND LEASING OOvPANY, 
Defendant. 
— o o O o o 
rhilL 'HUM"1 1'Hiii,1 «i'i i" <•• hearing 'before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, 
Judgr -* above-entitled Court, on January 16, 1991. The plaintiffs 
appearet person through their attorney of record, Franc 
The I appeared in person and through his. attorney of 
record, Steven Kuhnhausen. Kerry G, Staith appeared in person and representing 
himself. The plaintiffs, Steven Hays and H--1 ^ iii..;,
 Flll f|,,, ,[, f, M ] H I , ,^  
Smith, entered Settlement Agreement mi 
which William E. Hill and Kerry G. Staith agreed tllat Judgment may be entered 
against them personalis , j: ..Ins li ite res 1 at the rate 
of ten percent (10%) per annim fifty-three (53) months in the an i unt of 
$6,625.00, _ „ „ Judgmen* *„ u,i anx>unt ol $'21,625.00. Plaii :ni iffs ! 
JUDOUBTT 
11-15-^1 S-C^oivw. 
Civil No. 850900810CV 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
/ H I' > 9 ^  
counsel, Francis J. Nielson, read this Settlement Agreement into the record. 
The defendants William E. Hill and Kerry G. Snith stated to the Cburt that 
they understood and agreed to the Settlement Agreement, and having agreed that 
Judgment may be entered against them in favor of plaintiffs, and the 
plaintiffs, being also present in Court, having acquiesced in the Settlement 
Agreement, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS OEDERED, ADJUDC2D, AND DECREED that plaintiffs Steven Hays 
and Fred 0. Hays have and recover from defendants William E. Hill and Kerry G. 
Snith, the sun of $15,000.00, interest thereon at the rate of ten percent 
(10%) per annum for fifty-three (53) months, which interest arrounts to 
$6,625.00, for a total Judgment of $21,623^6. 
DATED this / g day of \MjK\, 1991. 
/ BY THE CXXRT: 
^^ (Z^</ls^^ 
PAT B. BRIAN 
Third District Court Judge 
-2- OU278 
ISSUES AN 11 TRJAI 
Rescission of instruments. 
In action to rescind instruments by which a 
defendant purports to have obtained title to the 
property of a plaintiff's ward, the fact that one 
document is the ward*6 will does not transfer it 
into a will contest, and the court may refuse 
the request for a jurv trial. Johnson v. John-
son, 9 I Jtah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959). 
Right to jury trial. 
Right to have a jury pass upon issues of fact 
does not include right to have a cause submit-
ted to the jury in hope of 8 verdict where the 
facts undisputably show that the plaintiff is 
not entitled to relief. Raymond v. Union Pac. 
R.R., 113 Utah 26, 191 P.2d 137 (1948). 
Defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the 
issue of damages, upon his demand, notwith-
standing that the paramount object of the 
plaintiff's action was to secure an injunction 
and that the claim for damages was but inci-
dental to the injunctive relief sought. Valley 
Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 119 Utah 204, 225 
P.2d 739 (1951). 
Where there is substantial contradictory evi-
dence on both sides, the case must be given to 
the jury- Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 
240 P.2d 491 (1952) 
Utah Law Review. — Right to Civil Jury 
Trial in Utah: Constitution and Statute, 8 
Utah L. Rev. 97. 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 47 Am Jur. 2d Jurv §§ 39, 
42, 45. 
C.J.S. — 50 CJ.S. Juries §§ 16 to 17, 22. 
A.L.R. — Right in equity suit to jury trial of 
counterclaim involving legal issue, 17 
A.L.R.3d 1321. 
Statute reducing number of jurors as viola-
tive of right to jury trial, 47 A.L.R.3d 895. 
Right to jury trial on motion to vacate judg-
ment, 75 A.L.R.3d 894. 
History: JL 1951, < b SH I"! ' MM I 
Supp., 104-21-2. 
Cross-References. — Contents of writings, 
recordings and photographs, determinations 
for jury, Rules of Evidence, Rule 1008. 
Court submission of special findings to jury, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49(a). 
Upon a subsequent trial of the same cause o' 
action, a plaintiff seeking damages is bound by 
his testimony concerning material and observ-
able facts given at the first trial which resulted 
in a nonsuit on the ground of contributory neg-
ligence, and cannot materially change such 
testimony in order to offset the defense of con* 
tributary negligence Therefore, the trial court 
does not err in refusing to submit the issue to 
the jury, and in granting the defendant's mo-
tion for a dismissal. Tebbs v. Peterson 122 
Utah 214, 247 P.2d 897 (1952) 
Specific performance action. 
Granting a jury trial in an action for specific 
performance of contract for the sale of land is 
not error where issues agreed upon at pretrial 
involved more than a mere reading and inter-
pretation of the alleged lease and option; there 
were issues as to whether the husband could, 
as a sole signatory, bind his nonsigning wife, 
whether a memorandum was sufficiently un-
clear as to justify the introduction of evidence 
to clarify it and issues as to intentions of the 
parties in executing the agreement. Corbet v. 
Cox, 30 Utah 2d 361, 517 P„2d 1318 11974!. 
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51 
A.L.R.4th 565. 
Right to jury trial in state court divorce pro 
ceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955. 
Small claims: jury trial rights in, and on ap-
peal from, small claims court proceeding. 70 
A.L.R.4th 1119. 
Propriety of substituting juror in bifurcated 
state trial after end of first phase and before 
second phase is given to jury, 89 A.L.R.4th 423. 
Key Numbers. — Jury «» 9 to 10V2, 14(2). 
Court to charge that the jury are the exclu-
sive judges of all questions of fact, Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 51. 
Trial by jury or court, Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rules 39(a) to (c). 
Verdict may be general or" special. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rules 49(a), (b), 58A(a). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-21-2. Jury to decide questions of fact. 
All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other than those mentioned 
in the next section [Section 78-21-3], are to be decided by the jury, and all 
evidence thereon is to be addressed to them, except when otherwise provided. 
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§ 1 6 8 7 HISTORY AND PURPOSE Ch. 5 
Rule 21 
just.6 The court should be particularly willing to exercise its 
power to order a party brought into the action if the absentee's 
presence is required under Rule 17(a) or Rule 19.7 As discussed in 
an earlier section,8 the court has the power to drop a party when it 
is necessary to preserve its diversity jurisdiction over the case. 
§ 1 6 8 8 . Motion to Add or Drop a Party 
Whether the motion pursuant to Rule 21 is to add or to drop a 
party, it must be made in the usual manner and with notice to the 
other parties. Notice need not be given to those whose joinder is 
sought, however.1 This result is proper since the rules do not 
Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., 
D.C.Ind.1961, 27 F.R.D. 431. 
Delia Plastering Co. v. D. H. Dave, Inc., 
D.C.Ohio 1951, 11 F.R.D. 304. 
Uarte v. U.S., D.C.Cal.1948, 7 F.R.D. 
705. 
Society of European Stage Authors & 
Composers v. WCAU Broadcasting 
Co., D.C.Pa.1940, 1 F.R.D. 264. 
But compare 
In Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 
D.C.Del.1960, 187 F.Supp. 179, af-
firmed C.A.3d, 1963, 313 F.2d 472, 
certiorari denied 83 S.Ct. 1693, 1695, 
374 U.S. 806, 10 L.Ed.2d 1031, the 
court held that if a party is properly 
joined under Rules 19 and 20, then 
Rule 21 does not authorize the court 
to drop that party on its own motion 
because he destroys diversity. Rule 
21 is concerned only with the nonjoin-
der and misjoinder of parties, not 
with the question whether jurisdic-
tion is proper. 
6. Court may impose terms 
The district court may drop or add par-
ties on its own initiative at any stage 
of the action on such terms as are 
just. Savoia Film S.A.I, v. Vanguard 
Films, Inc., D.C.N.Y.1950, 10 F.R.D. 
64. 
7. Absentee required 
A district court, in furtherance of jus-
tice and on its own initiative may, 
and in a proper case should, order the 
addition of an indispensable party 
plaintiff, even though no motion for 
the addition of the party has been 
made. Paper Container Mfg Co. v. 
Dixie Cup Co., D.C.Del.1947, 74 
F.Supp. 389, reversed on other 
grounds C.A.3d, 1948, 170 F.2d 333 
(dictum), certiorari denied 69 S.Ct. 
515, 336 U.S. 909, 93 L.Ed. 1074. 
8. Preserve diversity jurisdiction 
See § 1685. 
1. Notice unnecessary ' 
Hoffman for & on behalf of NLRB v. 
Beer Drivers & Salemen's Local 
Union No. 888, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & 
Helpers of America, C.A.9th, 1976, 
536 F.2d 1268. 
When following the motion to dismiss, 
on the ground that the original plain-
tiff lacked the capacity to bring a 
wrongful death action, plaintiff 
amended the complaint so as, inter 
alia, to substitute the alleged next of 
kin as voluntary plaintiffs no service 
of process was required on defendant. 
Roberts v. Husky Indus., Inc., D.C. 
Tenn.1973, 71 F.R.D. 479, 480, citing 
Wright & Miller. 
U.S. v. Bayer Co., D.C.N.Y.1952, 105 
F.Supp. 955. 
Reiling v. Bhattacharyya, N.D.1978, 270 
N.W.2d 562, 564, citing Wright * 
Miller. 
Pask v. Corbitt, 1975, 220 S.E.2d 378, 
381, 28 N.C.App. 100, citing Wright 
A Miller. 
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Ch. 5 MOTION TO ADD OR DROP PARTY § 1 6 8 8 
Rule 21 
expressly provide for notice in this situation; for example, Rule 
5(a) does not require that notice be given to the absentee. More-
over, an analogy may be drawn to Rule 14(a), which only requires 
notice to the parties of a motion to bring in a third-party defen-
dant. 
A defect in parties must be specifically raised and should not 
be argued indirectly through a motion for summary judgment 
under Rule 56.a If permission to add a party defendant is granted, 
plaintiff must comply with the requirements of Rules 3 and 4 
relating to the issuance of a summons and service on the added 
party.8 Typically, upDn the granting of a motion to add a plaintiff 
all proceedings are stayed until the new plaintiff enters an appear-
ance.4 It is not necessary, however, that the parties to be added 
under this rule submit their proposed pleading on the motion,5 as 
is required of intervenors under Rule 24.8 
Rule 21 specifically permits a change in parties "at any stage 
in the action."7 However, the court typically will deny a request 
Compare 
When a proposed settlement of actions 
brought as class actions against thir-
teen defendants for an alleged con-
spiracy to violate the antitrust laws 
involved only three defendants, the 
proposed settlements were an at-
tempt to compromise the claims of 
the class that had not been deter-
mined, and therefore Rule 23(e), per-
taining to giving notice of settlement 
to all members of the class was appli-
cable and not superseded by the pas-
sage in Rule 21 permitting parties to 
be dropped at any stage of the action. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda 
Am. Brass Co., D.C.Pa 1967, 42 F.R.D. 
324. See vol. 7B, § 1797. 
2. Motion to be specific 
Ziegler v. Akin, C.A.lOth, 1958, 261 
F.2d 88. 
Aleut Corp. v. Rogers, Alaska 1980, 619 
P.2d 472, 473, citing Wright & Mill-
er. 
3. Comply with Rules 3 and 4 
Same v. Fiesta Motel, DC.Pa.1978, 79 
F.R.D. 567, 570, citing Wright & 
Miller. 
Stanley Works v Haeger Potteries, Inc., 
D.C.I11.1964, 35 F.R.D. 551, 554. 
Blum v. Postal Tel., Inc., D.C.Pa.1945, 
60 F.Supp. 237. 
See also 
Spudnuts, Inc. v Lane, App.1984, 676 
P.2d 669, 670, 139 Ariz. 35, citing 
Wright & Miller. 
4. Proceedings stayed 
Askey v. C. & M. Service, D.C.Pa.1968, 
45 F.R.D. 242. 
5. Proposed pleadings unnecessary 
Fuller v American Mach. & Foundry 
Co., D.C.N.Y.1951, 95 F.Supp. 764. 
6. Intervention practice 
See vol. 7C, § 1914. 
7. Motion at any stage 
When defendant's trial counsel who had 
resisted joining the corporation as a 
party to the breach of contract action 
abruptly withdrew from the practice 
of law after the trial and defendant 
was required to retain a new attorney 
who promptly moved to join the cor-
poration as a plaintiff-counter-
defendant prior to the entry of judg-
ment the interests of justice and 
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SPUDNUTS, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
John LANE, dba Spudnuts Franchise, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
No. 2 CA-CIV 4735. 
Court of Appeals of Arizona, 
Division 2. 
Feb. 6, 1984. 
SPUDNUTS, INC. v. LANE Ariz. 669 
Cite as 676 V2d 669 (Arir.App. 1984) 
4. Process <S=J48 
Where service of process does not com-
ply with statutory requirements, court does 
not obtain jurisdiction over the person. 
5. Parties <S=»52 
Where no attempt was ever made to 
serve defendant's wife and wife's liability 
was not adjudicated by the trial court, she 
could not be subjected to liability by her 
addition as a party defendant after case 
had been decided on appeal. 16 A.R.S. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 21. 
After original judgment for plaintiff in 
breach of contract action was affirmed on 
appeal, plaintiff moved to add wife of de-
fendant as an additional party defendant. 
The Superior Court, Gila County, Cause 
No. CV 20,853, Edward L. Dawson, J., 
granted the motion, and defendant appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Birdsall, C.J., 
held that where no attempt was ever made 
to serve wife and wife's liability was not 
adjudicated by trial court, she could not be 
subjected to liability by her addition as a 
party defendant after case had been decid-
ed on appeal. 
Judgment vacated. 
1. Parties <8=>52 
Rule authorizing dropping or adding of 
parties by order of court at any stage of 
the action on such terms as are just does 
not allow postjudgment addition of party 
defendants. 16 A.R.S. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 21. 
2. Husband and Wife <3=>224 
Service of process on husband was not 
sufficient to permit obtaining ,of a personal 
judgment against his wife or the communi-
ty. 
3. Husband and Wife e=>270(10) 
A judgment against one spouse does 
not bind the community. A.R.S. § 25-215, 
subd. D. 
Cavness & DeRose by Jerry DeRose, 
Globe, for plaintiff/appellee. 
Patten, Montague & Arnett by Wayne C. 
Arnett, Tempe, for defendant/appellant. 
OPINION 
BIRDSALL, Chief Judge. 
This appeal arises from the amendment 
of a judgment to add a party-defendant 
after the original judgment was affirmed 
on appeal. 
The applicable facts are as follows. The 
original action was filed July 28, 1978, in 
Gila County Superior Court. The com-
plaint alleged a breach of a franchise 
agreement between appellee Spudnuts, Inc. 
and the appellant, John t&ne. The cause 
was submitted to the court on the record 
and judgment was entered April 23, 1981, 
against appellant. He appealed and we 
affirmed in Spudnuts, Inc. v. Lane, 131 
Ariz. 424, 641 P.2d 912 (App.1982). While 
the appeal was pending, appellee moved the 
trial court to amend the pleadings to add 
Gail Lane* wife of the appellant, as an 
additional party-defendant. The court de-
nied the motion because jurisdiction had 
been removed to this court. However, af-
ter the mandate of this court issued on 
March 18, 1982, appellee again moved the 
superior court to amend the pleadings to 
add Gail Lane. On October 29, 1982, the 
court filed an amended judgment, subject-
ing the new party-defendant to liability, 
and it is from this amended judgment that 
appellant has brought this appeal. 
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flj Appellee's motions to amend were 
based on Rules 15(b) and 21 Arizona Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 16 A R S Rule 15(b), 
however, allows amendments to conform to 
the evidence and does not apply here where 
the addition of a party defendant is sought 
Rule 21 does cover this situation It 
states 
"Misjoinder of parties is net grounds 
for dismissal of an action Pirties may 
be dropped or added by order of the 
court on motion of any party or of its 
own initiative at any stage of the action 
and on such terms as are just Any 
claim against a party may be severed and 
proceeded with separately " 
Appellee argues that since the rules are to 
be construed liberally and in a reasonable 
manner, Union Interchange, lnc v Ben 
ton, 100 Ariz 33, 410 P 2d 477 (1966), and 
technicalities are not to govern, Dons Club 
v Anderson, 83 Ariz 94, 317 P 2d 534 
(1957), the failure to include Gail Lane as a 
defendant was technical in nature and her 
addition, even after judgment and resolu 
tion on appeal, should be allowed Appel 
lee cites Benson v Hunter, 23 Ariz 132, 
202 P 233 (1921), which arose m a vastly 
different factual situation There, the An 
zona Supreme Court held that the dece 
dent's husband should have been joined in 
the complaint since it was not clear wheth 
er the complaint was referring to the dece 
dents separate property or to the marital 
community The court found that the trial 
court should have required the plaintiff to 
amend his complaint by joining the dece 
dent's husband with her in the case or 
dismiss the case for defects m naming the 
parties Our case is not capable of remand 
to the tnar court to have appellant's wife 
added and have the case proceed from the 
beginning Rather, we are faced with de 
cidmg whether Rule 21 allows postjudg 
ment addition of party defendants It does 
not 
In Moore v Knowles, 482 F 2d 1069 (5th 
Cirl973), the court found that Rule 21 
provided wide discretion for the joinder of 
parties but joinder must be accomplished 
within the requirements of due process In 
that case, the court found that while the 
trial court was correct in deciding whether 
judgment should be entered against a 
school board rather than just the individual 
members, its notification and joining the 
board in the final judgment was not suffi 
cient to obtain jurisdiction over the board 
However, the court was able to remand the 
case to the district court to allow the plain 
tiff to join the board as a corporate body 
[2,3] In the instant case, where no re 
mand is possible, and the case not only has 
been brought to judgment but has been 
laid to rest on appeal, we are faced with a 
due process violation by the addition of a 
party defendant who was not served in the 
action and who had no chance to answer 
and defend Service of process on appel 
lant is not sufficient to permit the obtain 
mg of a personal judgment against his wife 
or the community A R S § 25-215(D) pro 
vides that if a plaintiff wants to hold a 
marital community accountable for an obh 
gation, both spouses must be sued jointly 
A judgment against one spouse does not 
bind the community Eng v Stein, 123 
Ariz 343, 599 P 2d 796 (1979) 
Helpful language is found in Same v 
Fiesta Motel, 79 F R D 567 (E D Pa 1978) 
The court stated 
" only Fiesta was before the court 
when trial started Although under the 
provisions of Federal R Civ P 21, parties 
may be added by order of court on mo 
tion or on its own initiative at any stage 
of the action, the terms of jpinder must 
be just The parties to be added must be 
properly brought before the court or no 
judgment can be entered or enforced 
The requirements of due process must be 
met Moore v Knowles, 482 F 2d 1069 
1075 (5th Cir 1973) If permission to add 
a party defendant is granted plaintiff 
must comply W l t n the provisions of Rule 
3 and 4 relating to the issuance of sum 
mons and service C Wright and A 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1688 It is true that Arsenis has been 
present in the court room during the 
entire trial and had appeared as a wit 
ness His presence and testimony, how 
SPUDNUTS, INC. v. LANE 
Cite M 676 PJd 669 (Arir.App. 1984) 
Ariz. 671 
ever, did not amount to a submission to 
the jurisdiction of the court, [citations 
omitted]" 79 F.R.D. at 570. 
[4,5] It is fundamental where service 
of process does not comply with the statu-
tory requirements, the court does not ob-
tain jurisdiction over the person. Mullane 
v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co, 
339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 
(1950); Smith v. Smith, 117 Ariz. 249, 571 
P.2d 1045 (App.1977). No attempt was 
ever made to serve Gail Lane in this case. 
Gail Lane's liability was not adjudicated by 
the trial court and she cannot be subjected 
to liability by her addition as a party-de-
fendant after the case has been decided on 
appeal. Rule 21 only allows such an addi-
tion of a party on such terms as are "just" 
and we cannot ascertain how the procedure 
utilized in this case could ever be construed 
as just. 
The amended judgment entered on Octo-
ber 29, 1982, is vacated. 
HATHAWAY and HOWARD, JJ., con-
cur. 
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Ronald C. Barker #0208 
Attorney for William E. Hill s R 5 2 21 PH *3l 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Telephone (801) 486-9636 
FAX (801) 486-5754 Q&ZC (j. 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
ooOoo—•" '-^^ --^ .^-. ~J* „.. 
STEVEN HAYS and FRED HAYS, ) HILL'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
Plaintiffs, ) PROPOSED ORDER AND JUDGMENT, 
MOTION TO AMEND JDDGMENT, 
VS. ) MOTION FOR A TRIAL OR NEW TRIAL 
and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
MOUNTAIN EQUIPMENT SALES ) 
AND LEASING COMPANY, Civil No. 850900810 CV 
) 
Defendant. Judge Pat B. Brian 
) 
ooOoo 
William E. Hill's ("HILL"), by and through his attorney 
Ronald C. Barker ("BARKER"), hereby submits the following 
memorandum of authorities in support of his objections and 
motions. 
I 
Hill's objections and motions 
1. Hill's objections and motions - Hill has filed an 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED ORDER AND JUDGMENT, a MOTION TO 
AMEND JDDGMENT, a MOTION FOR A TRIAL, and/or a motion for a NEW 
TRIAL and has made a DEMAND FOR JORY TRIAL of said issues. Among 
other things said objection and motions ask the Court for an 
order amending said judgment and order so as to not award 
judgment against Hill individually and/or for a jury trial and/or 
- 1 -
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new trial by jury on all issues, including but not limited to the 
disputed issues as to whether the 1/16/91 stipulation constituted 
an agreement by Hill that he be individually joined as a 
defendant in this lawsuit and that judgment be entered against 
him individually. Said motions are supported by the affidavit of 
Hill filed herewith and by the prior motions and memorandums 
filed herein by Barker on behalf of Hill. 
_II 
Court's jurisdiction to grant relief 
2. Authority to object - Hill is authorized by RJS 4-504(2) 
to object to a proposed order as stated in 11 1 of Hill's motions. 
3. Authority for motions - The motions in 1[ 2 of Hill's 
motion for a jury trial and/or a new trial by jury on all issues, 
including but not limited to whether the 1/16/91 stipulation 
constituted an agreement by Hill that he be individually joined 
as a defendant in this lawsuit and that judgment be entered 
against him individually are authorized by and are made pursuant 
to the provisions of URCP 59(a)(1) [irregularity in proceedings 
of the court and/or abuse of discretion], 59(a)(6) [insufficiency 
of evidence to justify decision & fact that it is against law] , 
59(a)(7) [error in law], 60(b)(1) [mistake, etc.], 60(b)(4) 
[summons not served on Hill, etc.], 60(b)(5) [judgment is void], 
60(b)(7) and other applicable statutes, rules and laws. 
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Ill 
ARGUMENT 
4. Due process - Hill is entitled to not be deprived of his 
property without due process. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 7; 5th 
& 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
5. Right to trial - Art. I, S 11 of the Utah Constitution 
provides in part that "no person shall be barred from defending 
before any tribunal in this state, . . . , any civil cause to 
which he is a party. URCP 3, 5, 8f et seq. state the procedure 
for commencement of a civil action, URCP 4 provides for service 
of summons, etc. Hill has not waived his right to litigate the 
disputed issues in the usual manner, including the dispute as to 
the meaning of the stipulation and whether under the stipulation 
he was somehow made a party to the lawsuit and somehow allegedly 
consented that the judgment be against him individually. Hill is 
entitled to be served with summons and complaint, to file an 
answer, cross-claim against Smith, to conduct discovery, to 
attend a pre-trial and to have a trial by jury. To deny Hill 
that right is to deny him his due process rights. See Hill's 
2/21/91 memorandum herein, including but not limited to 1[ 22, 23 
and 24 thereof. 
6. Right to jury trial - Under 78-21—1, UCA, 1953, Hill is 
entitled to trial by jury with respect to said disputed issues. 
The Court's summary disposition of Hill's defenses at the 4/2/91 
hearing denied Hill his right to a jury trial. See URCP 38(a), 
39(a), et seq. Hill has made a demand for a jury trial. 
- 3 -
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7. Summary judgment improper because of disputed facts -
URCP 56 allows the Court to grant summary judgment only when 
there are no disputed material facts. The foregoing and Hill's 
affidavit filed herewith clearly demonstrate that there are 
disputed issues of fact which if resolved in favor of Hill would 
entitle him to avoid personal liability. Accordingly, the Court1 
rejection of Hill's defenses and (in effect) summary judgmentf 
were improper/ should be vacated and set aside and Hill should be 
given a trial on said issues. 
8. Incorporation by reference - Hill incorporates herein by 
reference thereto the allegations and arguments in his verified 
motions and memorandums filed herein dated about 2/21/91 and the 
content of his affidavit filed herewith. 
IV 
Conclusion 
The Court erred in ordering that the amended judgment be 
entered against Hill individually without affording Hill is due 
process and other rights under the federal and Utah 
constitutions/ statutes, rules, etc., including his right to be 
served with summons, to have a complaint stating the particulars 
of the claims, to discovery, to trial by jury, etc. before he is 
deprived of his property. Accordingly, that order should be 
vacated and the remaining issues should be determined by a trial 
in this case or in as a new lawsuit. 
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Dated the .1* day of ApriK) 1991. 
c 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney for Hill 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be 
mailed, postage prepaid/ on the y ^ day of April, 1991, to the 
following persons at the addresses indicated: 
Francis J. Nielson, Esq., ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON, 310 South 
Main #1305, Salt Lake City, Utah 8' 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney for Hill 
i. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HAYS, STEVEN 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
MOUNTAIN EQUIPMENT SALES & LE 
DEFENDANT 
TYPE OF HEARING: HEARING 
PRESENT: DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. NIELSON, FRANCIS J, 
D. ATTY. BARKER, RONALD C. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 850900810 CV 
DATE 04/02/91 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
COURT REPORTER HAL WALTON 
COURT CLERK AAB 
THIS MATTER COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING, APPEARANCES 
AS SHOWN ABOVE. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE LAST SETENCE IN 
THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION OF OCTOBER 29, 1990 AS READ INTO 
THE RECORD IS GRANTED. THE COURT MAKES FINDINGS, AND RULES AS 
FOLLOWS: 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IS GRANTED AS PER 
THE STIPULATION REACHED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 AS TO BOTH 
DEFENDANTS PERSONALLY. 
COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF WILL PREPARE THE FINDINGS BY APRIL 8, 
1991. 
iinoin 
COPY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN HAYS AND FRED 0. HAYS, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
MOUNTAIN EQUIPMENT SALES AND 
LEASING COMPANY, et al., 
Defendants• 
Civil Nc. C85-810 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
* * * 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
January 16, 1991 
BRAD J. YOUNG 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
I N D E X 
WITNESSES VOIR 
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT RECROSS DIRE 
Fred 0. Hays 12 16 27 33 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Steven Hays and Fred Hays vs. Mountain 
3 Equipment Sales and Leasing, C85-810. Counsel will state an 
4 appearance. 
5 MR. NIELSON: Francis Nielson for the plaintiffs. 
6 MR. KUHNHAUSEN: Steve Kuhnhausen for the defendant 
7 Ed Hill. 
8 THE COURT: The matter before the Court today is an 
9 evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of plaintiffs' 
10 default judgment; is that correct? 
11 MR. KUHNHAUSEN: Yes, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: You may proceed. 
13 MR. NIELSON: If I may make a brief statement. The 
14 judgment in this case was entered on July 31 of 1986 for the 
15 amount of $37,482.34 and costs of $63.50, some almost five 
16 years ago. In that action the defendant was properly served, 
17 there was a counterclaim involved, the defendants filed an 
18 answer, were represented by counsel. One of the counsel for 
19 the defendant withdrew, filed a notice to appoint counsel or 
20 appear in person, and they failed to do so. Judge Fishier 
21 scheduled a pretrial conference. The defendants failed to 
22 show up at the pretrial conference. 
23 So the question at that time was, what was the 
24 amount of the judgment to be entered, the amount of the 
25 default judgment? The file will reflect that the plaintiff 
1 filed an affidavit in support of the amount and the default 
2 judgment, and that's on file. It is an affidavit of Fred 
3 Hays. That outlines the amount of damages. So Judge Fishier 
4 had before him at that time evidence as to the amount to be 
5 entered in the default judgment. So at this stage, this 
6 judgment is almost five years old, and plaintiffs would 
7 respectfully argue that the merits of this case have already 
8 been decided by Judge Fishier. 
9 THE COURT: The only purpose that the Court is 
10 conducting an evidentiary hearing is to determine the amount 
11 of the plaintiffs' default judgment. 
12 MR. NIELSON: May I inquire, does that require us to 
13 put on evidence as to how we arrived at the figure? 
14 THE COURT: Do you have a document that you would 
15 like to mark: and submit? 
16 MR. NIELSON: I have the default judgment, and, of 
17 course, the original is in the file, signed by Judge Fishier. 
18 THE COURT: You may obtain that, and have them 
19 marked as exhibits. 
20 (An off-the-record discussion was held.) 
21 MR. KUHNHAUSEN: I would stipulate that we have 
22 copies here that would reflect those two documents. There is 
23 no reason to pull them out. 
24 MR. NIELSON: There is the minute entry that 
25 reflects Judge Fishler's ruling at the pretrial conference. 
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this hearing for an evidentiary hearing to determine the 
amount of the damages of the plaintiff. I think that's 
appropriate for the Court to do, in that whenever there is a 
default judgement entered merely on an affidavit, I think it is 
fair for the Court to look behind that. 
Counsel's opening remarks were somewhat incorrect in 
regards to the state of the file. There wasn't a counterclaim 
ever filed. What happened, within a matter of days, plaintiff 
and defendant in this action each filed complaints, each 
answered. As I pointed out to you previously, there was some 
inconsistencies, when you merged those two complaints and 
answers together, when the Court consolidated those two files 
in one pleading, I believe the defendants had alleged --
excuse me, I believe the plaintiffs had alleged a sole 
proprietorship, or a partnership. In the other pleading, it 
was counter alleged. So there is some real inconsistencies. 
I pointed those out to you, and they didn't sway you in terms 
of where we were in this case. 
But regarding the case in chief, we have the 
affidavit of the defendant, which is in the file, which, 
apparently, formed the basis of the Court's decision to enter 
judgment in the amount that the judgment was entered for. 
Nowhere in the file did Judge Fishier have the benefit of 
examining the lease, which is the underlying document that the 
plaintiff sued defendant on. You have that marked as 
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1 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9, when we had the evidentiary 
2 hearing. I am wondering if it is still here in the file, 
3 because it is important that the Court look at that during the 
4 I course of these proceedings. 
5 I Anyway, be that as it may, I intend to this morning 
6 cross-examine both plaintiffs about that lease. I think you 
7 will see, as we go through the testimony today, that nowhere 
8 in that lease are the defendants, Mountain Equipment Sales and 
9 Leasing, required under any circumstances to deliver title to 
10 the plaintiffs, for any purpose, until they have paid the 
11 balance of the residual on the lease. And you will see that 
12 the defendants — the plaintiffs, by that lease document, have 
13 indicated they accept the vehicle as is, that they agree, 
14 throughout the course of this lease agreement, that plaintiffs 
15 assume their own responsibility for any business losses they 
16 may have in conjunction with this lease. Really, that's what 
17 their cause of action is about. 
18 In the affidavit of the defendant Fred 0. Hays, that 
19 formed the basis of Judge Pishler's decision to enter the 
20 amount of the judgment, Fred 0. Hays indicates that the 
21 defendant agreed to furnish the plaintiffs with good title to 
22 the truck they were to lease, and to furnish good title, and 
23 license the truck in the State of Wyoming. It goes on to say 
24 other things. 
25 The lease is clear, and you are going to see that 
the lease is clear, that it is the responsibility of the 
lessee to license the vehicle, pay any licensing amounts, that 
the lessee waives any claim he may have for loss of business 
or loss of use or any other losses in conjunction with the 
lease. And you will further see that in plain language in 
this lease, on page 1 of the document entitled "Warranty," 
which is made a part of the lease, "Until full payment of all 
obligations of the purchaser hereunder, the seller reserves 
title to ail equipment furnished hereunder." 
Basically, I believe had Judge Fishier seen that 
lease and heard the evidence in this case, other than this 
affidavit of the plaintiff, he never would have entered a 
judgment for that amount/ because it is clear under the lease 
they are not entitled to that. We will point that out to the 
Court through testimony and through the introduction of that 
lease into evidence today. I believe it already is an 
exhibit. The copy I have is marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No, 9 from our last hearing. 
MR. NIELSON: May I respond briefly to that, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. NIELSON: I stand corrected. There was no 
counterclaim filed. I agree with the scenario as indicated by 
opposing counsel. But he also made a misstatement, and that 
was that the Court didn't have the lease. The lease was 
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attached to the p -i a :t n 11 f t G ' compla int. Now Mr . Kuhnhausen 
wantB to reargue --
THE COURT: The Court is not going tu go back and 
relitigate the decision rr, Juage Fishier. The purpose of this 
hearing, unless the Court misunderstood the position of both 
counsel i >•.-•:..:: * lis hearing, was to determine how much the 
default judgme* * - . - :-t . 
MR NIELSON: That's correct. 
MR. KUHNHAUSEN: That's correct, .; understand that. 
I think when t^: talk about that I guess we have to look at 
their prayer for relief in their complaint , ana 'ney have set 
for' Cuwu one of thrsjp causes c i action I thjnt' we harr to 
* &, - cem one at a tune and see if they are entitled to rr-~ • --
for any of them. I d -n't knuw we can establish the amount :;? 
the judgment, an less jvu hear that; evidence., I don't hare --
I haven't looked at the Court's file to see whether or nu t 
that was attached as an exhibit Ma,/bt it was, If It was, 
that's helpfii! K: .ur. , because 1 t h i n ^  a fair reading of it 
say:- they are not entitled to the things they were awardec 
money for, such as "ax and . ic en^^; njuney ae ttie\ have 
claimed loss i f business use In that lease, if the Court 
- \t: .art's tile, on page 2 of m e *^ase, 
paragraph 9 • • do you have that, udgi*"' 
THE COURT Taose documents are being broughr 
MR. KUHNHAUSEN: 1 think the? 1--.- -• . v., -d to 
plaintiffs1 complaint. That might be way down in the file. 
Maybe while we are waiting, if I can just point to the Court a 
couple of these things, if you have that lease, I think that 
will at least enlighten you as the evidence comes in today on 
those damages. 
MR. NIELSON: I object to introducing any further 
evidence, that it is res judicata. The amount of the judgment 
is on the face of the judgment, entered by the Court, signed 
by Judge Fishier over five years ago. I don't think it is 
proper now to go back and inquire about the amount of the 
judgment. It is res judicata. That should have been done 
timely five years ago. 
MR. KUHNHAUSEN: We are here because you set it here 
for an evidentiary hearing to determine it. I think we are 
here to show you how much, if any, plaintiffs' judgment ought 
to be for. We will concede plaintiff ought to be entitled to 
$150, which is his lost tools he claims. But beyond that, the 
lease is clear, he is not entitled to any other damages. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. The Court will 
determine -- if at some point in time in the proceedings the 
purpose of the hearing is being overextended, the Court will 
notify counsel. Have you established your prima facie case 
with the request that the Court take judicial notice of the 
documents — 
MR. NIELSON: I believe we have. 
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THE COURT: -- attendant to the obtaining of the 
default 1udgme nt ? 
MR. NIELSON: 1 beiipve so. If the Court 'wishes us 
to introduce evidence relevan* to the time five and a half 
years age as to how the plaintiffs came up with this 
amount — •* course, the affidavit is already on file. It 
is — the kind < rigorous evidence that we would need five 
and a half years later does not exist. 
THE COURT: The C ; ;• • ",-_;^eb that counsel for the 
defenda: . t whom «-h defaul* judgment was obtained, 
will ask ->;r. - questions cf * .e plaintiffs. The Court will 
monitor *r proceedings .-*"- , and determine where that 
wil ,1 * < • \ ,. z v... „ resit? 
MR. NIELSON: I would call K: Hay;< at least have 
him explain to the fmurt how we arrived at that, basically. 
As I Indicate, since this was heard five and a half years ajo, 
we were unable to come up with the rigorous kund of proof that 
we would have otherwIse done 
THE COURT: The documents are in the tile, setting 
forth the affidavit of Fred 0. Hays; a letter dated June 26, 
1986, from •\an,n"-. Medina to Judge Fishier, regarding the 
default judgment; the judgment dated -.;.y 3i 1996,, signed by 
Judge Fishier. The Court has fakpn judicial notice of those 
documents Y:;«u may ca 11 your first w I tness . 
FRED 0. HAYS, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the plaintiffs, being 
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, NIELSON; 
Q. Would you state your name and address, please. 
A. Fred 0. Hays, Green River, Wyoming, Box 734. 
Q. I show you a copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9. 
This is an exhibit which has already been introduced into 
evidence. This is the lease in question. I think your 
testimony was, at the time of our other evidentiary hearing, 
that you made a down payment on this truck. Can you tell the 
Court how you arrived at that down payment figure, and what 
that figure is. 
A. The figure was arrived at by Mr. Kerry Smith, $1,700 
in cash, and we traded a trailer in on it, allowed $4,000 for 
the trailer. 
Q. Is that amount reflected on the lease itself? 
A. Yes, $5,700. 
Q. This represents a total down payment of $5,700? 
A. Right. 
Q. You alleged in your complaint that since you did not 
have the proper licensing on this truck, you were not able to 
use the truck from August of 1986 until December of 1986. 
A. 1984, your Honor — 
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Q. Excuse me, 1984. 
A Yfb 
U 1 believe you allege in /nur tGHipiaint that you 
suffered damage? c i" O^O" per Gun How cid you arrive at that 
figure? 
A, It is based on rental rates of the truck at that 
time. br-Twppn ;;MJ and $55 an hour, ten-hour days. 
Q. How many days per month? 
A Wi. ., j.1
 Wouid vary T Laser: A* on 20 days a month. 
We :io oil f i 'd work, many, many times seven days a week. 
Q. You would have been involved m oiJ field \ ^ork tor 
seven days a week? 
A. Mainly, yes, 
Q. You figured that that won i -i DV f'.>0 per hour, $500 
per day? 
A. Right. 
Q. For 20 days per month? 
A, Yes
 r si r. 
Q. That's your gross income, is i'* 
A- Yes. 
Q. Against that, what expenses do you have? 
A, Approximately 50 percent. 
Q Who T rln f hey , ons I s t o f ? 
A Fuel, tires, maintenance, taxes, which are very 
1 i 11J t? road and fuel work in our t ype o t wo,?; k,. M :>s t I y of f -
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1 highway. 
2 Q. How long have you been in the trucking business? 
3 A. Off and on all my life. My father was in the 
4 trucking business way before I was born. I have been directly 
5 associated with it since I was 15 years old. 
6 Q. Have you had your own trucking business? 
7 A. Well, I was basically a partner. My son and I on 
8 this one, we are partners on this one. 
9 Q. So you had occasion to figure profit and loss on 
10 your operations? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Is it your testimony today that in this particular 
13 kind of operation you would have derived approximately a 50-
14 percent profit? 
15 A. Yes, sir. 
16 Q. So that would be about $250 per day? 
17 A. Right. 
18 Q. And you had about — 
19 A. As far as 70 days, I figured we were denied the use 
20 of the truck. 
21 Q. Why were you — what do you mean you were denied use 
22 of the truck? 
23 A. Couldn't license it. There is one thing I would 
24 like to clarify. 
25 MR. KUHNHAUSEN: I ask that the witness1 remarks be 
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highway. 
Q. Ilun icnj ncive you been in the trucking business? 
A. C M and on all my .life My father was in 4 *ie 
trucking business way before 1 was born. I have been directly 
associated w i c h i t s in c e 1 was J 6 years old, 
Q. Have you had your own trucking business? 
A. Wei I was basically a partner. My 53on and I on 
this c. - e partners en this one. 
Q. So you had occasion to figure prof it and loss on 
your operations? 
A Yes 
Q. "J s it your testimony today I hat. In this particular 
kind c Hrauori you would have derived approximately a 50-
percent profit? 
A. Yes, sir, 
Q. 5 c t ill a 1, w ou J cl be about f; 2 S 0 p e r day ? 
Right. 
And you had about --
A. As rar as id days, I figured we were denied the use 
of the truck, 
Q. Why were you whnt do you mean you were denied use 
of the truck? 
A. Couldn f t 1 icense 21. There ,1 s one th :I rig I woi 21 d 
like to clarify. 
Mn, KUHNHAUSEN: I ask that the witness 1 remarks be 
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limited to the questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
A. We were not furnished a certificate of registration 
or title, and the State of Wyoming requires a certificate of 
title or a previous registration before you can buy a license 
for a truck in the State of Wyoming. I am sure Utah's must be 
in the same category. 
Q. Under the lease you made the down payment of $5,700, 
and you took possession of the truck? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you took the truck to Wyoming? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were not able to run it over the road because it 
was not licensed? 
A. Thatfs correct. 
Q. How many payments did you make under the lease? 
A. Two payments. 
Q. What did those total? 
A. 2,000. 
Q. Was this figure $2,332.84? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The lease reflects one payment would be on a monthly 
basis $1,166.42; is that correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. Two payments is $2,332.84. You alleged in your 
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complaint that you lost $150 worth of tools when the truck' was 
repossessed. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Were those tools returned to you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you pay some sales and use tax on this vehicle? 
A. Yes. There is $492 sa Ies tax. 
Q. So it is your testimony today, as it was when this 
judgment was entered, that the figure in the judgment is 
proper and correct? 
A. I do. 
MR. NIELSOK That's a:I„ your Honor. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KUHNHAUSEN: 
Q You testified that you have been in the trucking 
business previously to entering into this lease agreement; is 
that. r:ght? 
Yes, sir. 
MR NIELSON: Mav I just for the record, reflect a 
continuing objection into going into the merits of the 
judgment. Maybe I did t ha t pr evi^us 1y. 
MF KUHNHAUSEN ' think: he waived that, Judge, by 
his direct. 
THE COURT: Just
 a m\me; it, Your objection is noted 
fox: i:t le record. The Court indicated when it gave its
 ruiing 
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1 that, because it was a default judgment, it was appropriate, 
2 in equity, if for no other basis, to determine a fair amount 
3 of the judgment, rather than set the judgment, in its 
4 entirety, aside. That's what the Court will do in this one-
5 hour hearing. You may proceed. 
6 Q. You testified on direct examination that it cost you 
7 $50 per hour for a ten-hour day for every day you didn't have 
8 that truck; is that right? 
9 A. Yes, sir. 
10 Q. Do you have any evidence today to show any contracts 
11 that you lost or any business that you lost, other than your 
12 testimony? 
13 A. No, I have none. 
14 Q. You indicated that your costs were approximately 50 
15 percent of the amount of the money that you would receive from 
16 putting the truck to use for ten hours; is that right? 
17 A. That's correct. 
18 Q. You talked about tax, you talked about tires, fuel? 
19 A. Yes, sir. 
20 Q. What other expenses did you have in conjunction with 
21 that? 
22 A. Very little. We did all of our own maintenance, all 
23 of our own tire repairs, we drove ourselves. The only direct 
24 expense we had was for parts and fuel, oil, tires. 
25 Q. That's all? 
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A Yes , 
M _ L i d n ' t v«'");,, n-ilsr i\irje a l e a s e payment? 
A Yes . 
Q. Your lease payment was $1,166,42 per month? 
k. Correct. 
Q. II you divide that by 12, you get approximately $96 
per day for the cost of the ase of tne vehicle; is that right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So you have to add -- on top of your 50 percent, you 
have to add another $96 per :o\. right? 
A. I would *<- - with that. 
Q. I am going * :-: *~ . -. what has been prev3,-usly 
marked as Plaintiff's Exh s a^v you to take a look 
at :.Lat, Vou have i ~-?Y r -n. .t ^f /. , am sorry. 
Mr. Hays, is Plaintii* - Exhibit -. „ i consists of ten 
pages -- is that / nag^^ * ^ u lave in yours? 
A. Yes. 
Q. ThaT encompasses the en tin" lca\*k agreement 
regarding thi* I (J 7 i Fcra truck; is that right? 
A 'To the best of my knowledge. 
13 that, your signature appearing on the cover sheet? 
A. YP!i It JS. 
Q, Did you also sign It over on page oi i the fourth 
page? 
A. "Y e & , e i r . 
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Q. Did you also sign the document on the sixth page, 
declaration of purpose? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You also signed the document on the seventh page? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You had a chance to read this, did you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you have experience in leasing trucks in the 
past, in conjunction with your business? 
A. There is no disagreement with this lease agreement 
as such. 
Q. My question is, do you have experience in leasing 
other truclcs in conjunction with your business? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. You have had the occasion, prior to entering into 
this lease, have you not, Mr. Hays, to license motor vehicles 
in the State of Wyoming? 
A. Yes, sir. But I had registration. 
Q. That calls for a yes or no answer. 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you had previous experience with the State of 
Wyoming in licensing vehicles? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You can read and write, can't you, Mr. Hays? 
A. Normally. 
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Q. Did you read this document? 
A. which one° 
Q. Plaintiff's Exhibit Nc. 9. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let's focuf; nr/v ..i, ihis document for lust a minute, 
bu: ifcit'c gc back to your affidavit, dated the 19th day of 
May, 1986, which previously has beei, marked as Defendants' 
Exhibit B, and J t; is probably not in the Court's file, because 
I have it here. I am going to offer this exhibit. 
MR. NIELSON: 't have any objection, other than 
the objections 1 have already stated. 
Q. I want you to take a minute - - - ridavit, 
if you could. Havr von had a chance to read that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr Hays, there is a port ion of this, paragraph — 
unnumbered paragraph b, that has been crossed off, Do you see 
that? 
A Yes sir 
Q. 1 *• at j,i€ af's. to say, "That the defendants agreed to 
pay the license and taxes due for the State of Wyoming which. 
had to be paid by t he p1 ai n tif f s, 111 xhe sum G f S492, Is 
that what IT says/ 
A That's an inadvertent error by rn
 h
in viuus aTtorney. 
Q. There was i io agreement between you and the defendant 
to pay for your taxes and licenses to the State of WvominqV1 
1 I A. That's what I tried to explain a while ago when you 
2 stopped me. That was an error by my previous attorney. There 
3 was no agreement they were to license the truck. 
4 1 Q. You made this affidavit after your attorney told you 
5 Judge Fishier wanted you to file an affidavit regarding 
6 damages; is that right? 
7 A. Yes, sir. 
8 Q. You claim in unnumbered paragraph 3, "That the 
9 defendant agreed to furnish the plaintiffs with good title to 
10 the truck they were to lease and to furnish good title and 
11 license the truck in the State of Wyoming within a few days. 
12 That the defendant in fact did not have title to the truck, 
13 and were unable to furnish title to the plaintiffs until about 
14 December 12, 1984, making it impossible for the plaintiffs to 
15 use the truck in their business prior to that date." 
16 A. Correct. 
17 Q. That was the truth then, and it is the truth now, 
18 isn't it? 
19 A. Yes, sir. 
20 Q. I am going to ask you to look at that copy of 
21 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9, and point out to me and for the 
22 Court's benefit somewhere in that document where it says that 
23 the defendant has an obligation to give you title. 
24 MR. NIELSON: I object to that, your Honor. The 
25 agreement speaks for itself. 
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THE COURT; Overruled. 
Q . me maki' M t^ i.-le. . 1 will withdraw my question, 
or maybe - ephrase it lor you Would you turn tu the page ' li... t 
says "Warranty," about four pages back, i ivt pages back. 
A . *VJ, JL * t. 
Q. Will :c .. look at paragraph 9 therein. Take a rcii mte 
tc read that. 
A . T r e a cl 11 . 
Q. That was part of the agreement, was it not? 
A. As tar as the tit; ,1c? is. concerned, that's part of the 
agreement \ej sir. 
Q . P j d you eve r make i -.1 -. payment o f a ] ,3 ob 1 i g a t i ons 
regarding this lease? 
A. No , sir. 
Q. Let me ask you to turn your attention u? the page 2 
of the lease, and paragrapa 'j and ask you to re^d that. 
A, (The witness complies., ) 
Q. Do you understand tha* paragraph'1 
A , Vt-3 bir , 
Q, Y ou have t o speak audibly. 
A. Pardon? 
Q . You nave to speak audibly. 
A. Ye s, I unde rs t and. 
Q^ That was pari of the agreement, also, was it not? 
A. Yes, cH~. 
Q. Would you turn to page 7 of the agreement, a 
document entitled "Addendum to Lease Agreement.1' About 
halfway down the page, or a third of the way down the page, it 
says "Disclaimer." Do you find that part? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Take a minute to read that, please. 
A. (The witness complies.) 
Q. Was that page part of the agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now turn to the last page, please. You have already 
testified that your signature is on that page. 
A. Yes. 
Q. In the first paragraph, I want you to read the last 
line, which begins with, nWe accept." 
MR. NIELSON: We stipulate to these agreements. 
There is no issue here. 
THE COURT: What is your objection? 
THE WITNESS: Which page is that on? 
MR. KUHNHAUSEN: Page 10. 
(An off-the-record discussion was held.) 
MR. NIELSON: We stipulate to the validity of the 
agreements. I don't think it is proper for Counsel to make my 
client read this agreement in open court. 
THE COURT: Do you understand the question? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
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THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. At the time you entered into this lease, did you 
accept the equipment as satisfactory in all respects for the 
purpose of the lease? 
A. The equipment, I did, yes. 
Q. Did the defendants furnish you with a dump truck? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it the same dump truck that was described in the 
lease agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You understand in your complaint, paragraph 4, you 
complain that you didn't have proper registration, because the 
lessor didnTt furnish it to you; is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. I would like you to turn once again to your lease, 
Exhibit 9, and go to page 2 of the lease, which would be 
paragraph 4, the top of the page, says taxes, licensing, 
registration. 
A. I agree with that. That does not pertain to the 
registration. 
Q. Can you show me anything in the lease where you rely 
on a duty of the defendants, the lessors, to provide you with 
any registration? 
A. That should be — that's normally understood, that 
they will -- registration is required before you can license 
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in any state. 
Q. You knew that, didn't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You knew that about Wyoming? 
A. He promised me I would have registration in ten 
days. 
MR. KUHKHAUSEN: I object, anything that is net 
responsive to my questions, and that certainly wasn't, about 
any promise, and would object for the further reason that it 
goes beyond the lease, and he has testified that the lease is 
the encompassment of their agreement. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. So, Mr. Hays — 
MR. NIELSON: He may answer the question. ^e was 
just about to say --
THE COURT: Do you have anything further to say on 
that question? 
THE WITNESS: The only thing is, I agree with all of 
this, with the exception that every state in the union I know 
of requires a certificate of registration before you can 
license a vehicle. If you can't license a vehicle, it is no 
good. I wouldn't have bought it, if I had known I couldn't 
get a registration. 
Q. The fact remains, doesn't it, that you agreed and 
accepted this truck, signed this agreement, using your 
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expertise as a trucking person from Wyoming, having registered 
trucks there before, vehicles there before, you just drove 
away with this truck without any provision in the agreement 
for the lessor defendants to provide you with title until you 
paid for it, or any registration documents; is that right? 
A. He promised to send me a registration, 
Q. That's not my question. My question calls for a yes 
or no answer. 
A. Would you rephrase it, please. 
Q. It was a long, complicated question. 
Mr. Hays, you signed this lease agreement, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The entire agreement you had? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Nowhere in the agreement does it say that the 
defendants are required to give you a title? 
A. Doesn't say that, no. 
Q. Doesn't say they are required to give you any 
registration documents, does it? 
A. Doesn't say that. 
Q. Based on your expertise as a trucking person, your 
knowledge of the Wyoming registration laws from your past 
experience, you drove away in the truck, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. You made a down payment? 
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1 A. Yes, sir. 
2 Q. You made two lease payments? 
3 A. Right. 
4 Q. You had the truck for how long? 
5 A. From the 30th of August until about the 10th or 12th 
6 J of January. 
Q. How many days during that period of time did you 
operate that truck? 
A. We didn't operate it. 
Q. Never? 
A. Just from here to the State of Wyoming. 
Q. So you had the truck for four months -- for six 
months, and you made two lease payments? 
A. Right. 
Q. Pciid a down payment, and you are seeking a judgment 
for $37,000? 
A. Right. 
MR. KUKNHAUSEN: Plus interest? No further 
questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything? 
MR. NIELSON: Yes. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. NIELSON: 
Q. It is your testimony, is it not, that the 
defendants, one of the defendants promised you that they would 
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provide you with registration? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Who promised you that? 
A. Mr. Smith, Kerry Smith. 
Q. When was that promised? 
A. The day we left here with the truck. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. May I explain how this came about? 
Q. Tell me about the conversation between you and 
Mr. Smith about the registration. 
A. We found out we couldn't get a trip permit to get 
out of the State of Utah. I went back to Mr. Smith to find 
out about it. He said they have an out-of-state title. Gave 
us a dealer's tag. He said, "I will have you the registration 
in ten days." 
MR. KUHNHAUSEN: I am going to make an objection. 
This is all parol evidence, it shouldn't come in here today. 
This document is clearly -- as plaintiff has testified, is the 
sum of their agreement. Any conversations or anything that's 
not embodied in this document is irrelevant and inadmissible. 
MR. NIELSON: This conversation came in after --
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. You stated you tried to take the truck from the 
State of Utah to the State of Wyoming, but you found out that 
you couldn't do that. How did you find that out? 
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Q. I am just asking you about your conversation with 
Mr. Smith. 
A. He said, ,fI will give you a dealer's tag to get it 
into Wyoming, and I will have you the registration within ten 
days." 
Q. Did he give you a dealer's tag? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You took the truck to Wyoming? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What happened after that? 
A. Sent the dealer tag back to him, and waited on the 
registration, which I never got. 
Q. Did Mr. Smith make a trip to Wyoming? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did anyone from MESL make a trip to Wyoming? 
A. Mr. Ed Hill did. 
Q. When was that? 
A. In December, about the middle of December. 
Q. Was this trip to help you out with your 
registration? 
A. He brought a title down. He had a Wyoming title 
made for the truck. 
Q. Do you remember the date when he went to Wyoming? 
A. I think it was the 12th of December. 
Q. 12th of December? 
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A. I believe. 
Q- Did you meet with him at that time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you make an effort to get the truck registered? 
A. Yes, we did register it that day — I beg your 
pardon -- we didn't register it that day, because I didn't 
have a sales agreement to show the price of the truck, so they 
would know how much sales tax to charge, so I couldn't 
register it. I had to wait for a document showing what the 
resale value of the truck was, before I could pay the sales 
tax on it, which happened probably ten days later. 
Q. Did you ever get the truck registered? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you able ever to use the truck on the highways 
of Wyoming? 
A. It was wintertime by then, 40 below zero, and the 
work was all shut down by that time for the winter. 
Q. Did you attend the pretrial conference in this case 
here in Salt Lake? 
MR. KUHNHAUSEN: I think the record reflects who 
attended it. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. Yes. I beg your pardon. Maybe I don't understand 
the question. 
Q. At the time that your former attorney was going to 
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court to get this judgment entered, did you meet with the 
judge here in Salt Lake? 
A. The day the judgment was awarded, I did, yes, sir. 
Q. Did you go to Judge Fishier's chambers, to his 
court? 
A. Just in the courtroom. 
Q. Who was present? 
A. Judge Fishier; myself; and James Medlin, my former 
attorney. 
Q. Do you recall those proceedings? 
A. Somewhat, yes. 
Q. Were you asked to give any oral testimony at that 
time? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did Mr. Medlin make an argument in your behalf? 
A. As far as I know, all this had been presented to the 
judge before I showed up there, as close as I can remember. 
Q. Why did you want to lease this truck? 
A. Well, we had lots of work for trucks at that time. 
I had owned trucks previously. It was a good opportunity to 
make some good money with a truck. 
Q. What work was available when you took possession of 
this truck? 
A. Several jobs: road work, oil field construction 
work, several contractors I worked for before, that were in 
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1 need of trucks. 
2 Q. I realize it has been almost six years. Do you 
3 recall any of the names of these people? 
4 1 A. Shirl Brothers Construction for one, Debernardo 
5 Construction out of Rock Springs, Sunrise Construction from 
6 Rock Springs, Ted's Construction from Green River. I worked 
7 J for all of them at one time or another. 
8 Q. So it is your testimony that you had work and you 
9 could have put this truck to use, had it been properly 
10 registered? 
11 A. Yes, sir. 
12 MR. NIELSON: No further questions, your Honor. 
13 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
14 BY MR. KUKNHAUSEN: 
15 Q. Did you ever drive to Salt Lake to obtain 
16 registration for the truck, after you purchased it, before 
17 Mr. Hill came up? 
18 A. I made about three trips down here. 
19 Q. Is it your testimony, and you would have this Court 
20 believe that Wyoming was going to charge you a sales tax for a 
21 transaction that took place in the State of Utah? 
22 A. Absolutely. They charge sales tax on the license in 
23 the State of Wyoming. 
24 Q. You testified by the time you got it registered, it 
25 was too cold to work? 
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1 A. Right. 
2 Q. When did it get cold? 
3 I A. December. 
4 Q. December what? 
5 A. Well, I don't know exact date. It was in the month 
6 of December. 
7 Q. You are asking the Court to give you $500 a day for 
8 every day you couldn't use the truck. You have testified that 
9 at least at the time when you went to get the truck registered 
10 with Mr. Hill, that you couldn't work that day, because it was 
11 too cold. 
12 A. It was over 90 days before that, though. 
13 MR. KUHNHAUSEN: No further questions for this 
14 witness, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Counsel will approach the bench. You 
16 may step down. 
17 (An off-the-record discussion at the bench.) 
18 (A recess was taken.) 
19 THE COURT: At the conclusion of the direct, 
20 cross-examination, redirect and recross of the plaintiff 
21 Fred 0. Hays, counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant 
22 requested a recess to discuss a stipulated resolution of these 
23 proceedings., Have you arrived at a stipulated solution? 
24 MR. NIELS0N: I think we have, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Read it into the record. 
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MR. NIEL.5QU-: —The - judgment in behalf of the 
plaintiffs and. against the defendants n&y be entered for 
$15,000 plus interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum for 
53 months. The plaintiffs stipulate that they will not take 
any action on the judgment for ten days, to permit the parties 
to attempt to work out some sort of repayment schedule. 
THE COURT: Do the defendants, through counsel, so 
stipulate? 
MR. KUHNHAUSEN: I only represent Mr. Hill. I can 
only speak on behalf of him. He would agree that an equitable 
amount of the judgment should be $15,000. That doesn't waive 
any claims he may have that he wasn't a partner, your Honor, 
whether or not he received notice, and those other claims, for 
the record. 
MR. NIELSON: I donft know quite what that means. 
MR. KUHNHAUSEN: Means we are here today on an 
evidentiary hearing, the Court would determine what the 
judgment would have been had your --client -put on a case. We 
will agree that $15,000 is( a fair settlements- fair figure 
for the judgment to be entered. I don't know whether my 
client will ever appeal the issue of whether the Court 
determined him to be a partner, or not. I don't think that's 
really an issue that has to be linked to this judgment amount. 
With that understanding, we would stipulate. 
MR. NIELSON: I think all he is saying is he 
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COURT: 
, does 
HILL: 
COURT: 
Kerry G. Smith, have 
entire 
He is entitled to that. With that 
Mr. Hill so stipulate? 
Yes, that's fine. 
It is so ordered. To the defendant 
you been present in court during the 
time the evidentiary hearing was held? 
MR. 
THE 
SMITH: 
COURT: 
the stipulation was 
judgment? 
client 
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SMITH: 
COURT: 
capacity with 
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SMITH: 
COURT: 
SMITH: 
it. Of the $15,000, 
$1,700 
Yes, I have 
Have you been present during the time 
read into the record, regarding the 
Yes, I have. 
Have you consulted in a nonattorney-
other participants in this lawsuit? 
Yes. 
Do you understand what is being 
Yes, I do, your Honor. 
Do you so stipulate? 
Your Honor, I only have one problem 
$5,700 of that shows down payment. 
with 
in cash, $4,000 in trade. The $4,000 trade was never 
received, nor 
to $11, 000 of 
(An 
was cl ear title received. So I would stipulate 
the $15,000. 
off-the-record discussion was held.) 
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THE COURT: Do you so stipulate? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Counsel for the plaintiff will prepare 
an order and the stipulation. Those documents are to be 
submitted to the Court on or before January 23, 1991, for 
signing and filing with the clerk. The Court is hopeful that 
a payment schedule that is acceptable to everyone can be 
arrived at. 
(This proceeding was concluded at 2:40 p.m.) 
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